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SALT IN THE WOUNDS: ISSUES AND SOLUTIONS 
SURROUNDING THE TCJA SALT DEDUCTION CAP 
Carmella R. Campisano* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“The United States Senate just passed the biggest in history Tax Cut 
and Reform Bill. Terrible Individual Mandate (ObamaCare)Repealed [sic]. 
Goes to the House tomorrow morning for final vote. If approved, there will 
be a News Conference at The White House at approximately 1:00 P.M.”1  
And with a tweet, sent out shortly after 1:00 a.m., Donald Trump 
announced one of the most expansive legislative enactments of his 
presidency thus far, tax legislation informally known as the Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act (the “TCJA”).  This enactment would be the first major change to 
the tax code since the Tax Reform Act of 1986.2 
Unlike most tax bills, the TCJA made its way through both the House 
of Representatives (the “House”) and the Senate at near record speed, with 
its referral to the House Committee on Ways and Means on November 2, 
2017,3 and its signature into law on December 22, 2017.4  Its meteoric rise 
left most taxpayers and members of Congress completely in the dark as to 
the impact these reforms would have, both on those paying the tax and the 
national government relying on the tax revenue.  Time has also failed to 
further elucidate the short- and long-term impacts these changes will have.  
Nowhere, however, is this uncertainty as compelling as with the 
amendments to the state and local tax (“SALT”) deductions.5 
This Comment will examine the new SALT deduction cap and its 
impact.  In light of the potential consequences, it will argue that changes to 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., The College of New 
Jersey.  I would like to express my gratitude to my faculty advisor, Professor Tracy Kaye, 
for her guidance and support in the writing of this Comment.  I would also like to thank my 
parents for inspiration, guidance, and support throughout my writing process.   
 1  Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Dec. 20, 2017, 1:09 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/943362605258813441. 
 2  See infra Part III.  
 3  Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, H.R. 1, 115th Cong. (2017).  
 4  An Act to provide for reconciliation pursuant to titles II and V of the concurrent 
resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054, 2054 
(2017) [hereinafter Tax Cuts and Jobs Act]. 
 5  Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, supra note 4, at 2085–86. 
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the new SALT amendments are necessary.  Because the attempts being 
made by various states to circumvent the law are likely to fail, the best 
alternative is amendment of the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC” or “the 
Code”).  Instead of just applying a blanket cap of $10,000 on all SALT 
deductions, the deduction should instead phase out based on the taxpayer’s 
adjusted gross income (“AGI”) to the capped deduction of $10,000.  Part II 
will provide background on deductions generally and the SALT deduction 
specifically.  Part III will look at the differences between the new and the 
old deduction and examine the legislative intentions behind each.  Part IV 
will look at the potential and current impact of the cap on taxpayers, states, 
and businesses.  Part V will examine the various legislative workarounds 
that high-property-value states have enacted to lessen the impact on their 
taxpayers through legislation.  Part VI will examine the lawsuit that high-
property-value states have filed against the Secretary of the Treasury to 
invalidate the provision.  Part VII, considering the likely impact of the cap 
and the remote chance that any other attempt at reform will affect the Code, 
will propose a more equitable reformation of the current tax code that will 
not hurt certain geographic areas the way the current law does.  Finally, 
Part VIII will conclude. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Under the United States’ progressive income tax system, taxes are 
computed as a graduated percentage of individual’s taxable income at 
increasing rates.6  Taxable income comprises the taxpayer’s gross income 
less applicable deductions.7  This taxable income is then taxed at 
“increasing marginal rates of tax; for example, 10% on the first $10,000 of 
taxable income, 15% on the second $10,000, 30% on the third $10,000, and 
so forth.”8  The resulting amount, less any credits the taxpayer may have, is 
his or her tax obligation.9  Deductions function to lower the taxpayer’s 
taxable income, and thus his or her overall tax obligation.10 
“Above-the-line” deductions are subtracted from gross income to 
reach the taxpayer’s AGI.11  Common “above-the-line” deductions include 
student loan interest12 and trade or business expenses.13  These deductions 
 
 6  STAFF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 115TH CONG., OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL TAX 
SYSTEM AS IN EFFECT FOR 2018 3 (Comm. Print 2018) [hereinafter “JCT Overview”].   
 7  Id.  
 8  Martin J. McMahon, Jr. & Alice G. Abreu, Winner-Take-All Markets: Easing the 
Case for Progressive Taxation, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 12 n.31 (1998).  
 9  JCT Overview, supra note 6, at 3.  
 10  Id. 
 11  26 U.S.C. § 62(a) (2018). 
 12  Id. § 221(a). 
 13  Id. § 162(a). 
CAMPISANO (DO NOT DELETE) 11/15/2019  7:22 PM 
2019] COMMENT 527 
can be taken regardless of whether the taxpayer ultimately utilizes the 
standard deduction or itemizes “below-the-line.”14 
After determining AGI, the taxpayer can take a “below-the-line” 
deduction, in addition to “above-the-line” deductions.15  The first option for 
the taxpayer’s “below-the-line” deduction is the standard deduction, which 
is an applicable standard amount that corresponds to the taxpayer’s filing 
status.16  In 2018, for those “filing single” the deduction was $12,000.17  
For “married, filing jointly” the deduction was $24,000.18  For “married, 
filing separately” the deduction was $12,000.19  Finally, for “head of 
household” the deduction was $18,000.20  For every filing status, these 
deductions are almost a twofold increase over the prior year’s standard 
deduction amounts.21 
The other option for the taxpayer’s “below-the-line” deduction is to 
itemize personal deductions, which allows the taxpayer to add together 
certain qualifying expenses, such as charitable contributions,22 medical 
expenses,23 state income and property taxes,24 and mortgage interest25 and 
deduct this amount from his or her AGI.  Certain deductions have floors, 
which means that only the excess over a set percentage of the taxpayer’s 
AGI is deductible.26  Others have ceilings, which limit the amount that can 
be taken to a percentage of the taxpayer’s AGI.27  Taxpayers may take 
either the standard deduction or they may itemize, but not both.28  The 
determination will turn on whether the taxpayer’s allowable itemized 
 
 14  JCT Overview, supra note 6, at 4. 
 15  Id. 
 16  Id. 
 17  26 U.S.C. § 63(c)(7).  
 18  Id.   
 19  Id.  
 20  Id. § 63(c)(2)(A). 
 21  Id. § 63(c)(2). 
 22  Id. § 170 (allowing deduction of contributions to qualifying charitable entities but 
limited to a percentage of the taxpayer’s AGI depending on the character of the 
contribution). 
 23  26 U.S.C. § 213 (allowing deductions for qualifying expenses in excess of 10% of 
AGI as of January 1, 2019). 
 24  Id. § 164 (allowing up to a $10,000 deduction for state property and income taxes 
paid). 
 25  Id. § 163 (allowing a deduction for the interest paid on the acquisition indebtedness 
up to $750,000 for a qualifying residence). 
 26  See, e.g., id. § 213(a) (floor for medical interest deductions is 7.5% of AGI for 2018 
and 10% of AGI thereafter). 
 27  See, e.g., id. § 170 (allowing a deduction for charitable contributions subject to a 
ceiling based on the taxpayer’s AGI and the type of property donated). 
 28  Id. § 63(b). 
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deductions exceed the applicable standard deduction.29 
The TCJA, with a focus on simplification, has greatly increased the 
amount of the standard deduction, making it more likely that taxpayers will 
utilize this method over itemization.30  Prior to the TCJA, in 2014, thirty 
percent of taxpayers itemized and the rest took the standard deduction.31  
While the number of taxpayers that will itemize is expected to decrease 
because of the TCJA, it is still anticipated that around 20.4 million 
taxpayers will itemize in 2018.32  Thus, changes to IRC regarding 
itemization still have the potential to impact many taxpayers.33 
Under the IRC, by means of the itemized personal deductions 
discussed above, taxpayers are permitted to deduct expenditures on state 
and local taxes.34  These deductions consist of payments to state and local 
government for real estate and personal property taxes, in addition to either 
income taxes or general sales taxes, which are “tax[es] imposed at one rate 
with respect to the sale at retail of . . . items.”35  Most notably, the 
deduction for these payments is widely taken in states with high income 
taxes, high property taxes, or both, like New Jersey, New York, Maryland, 
and Connecticut.36  The fact that property tax payments in these states are 
higher means that the itemization of deductions is likely to be greater than 
the use of the standard deduction for those states’ taxpayers.  For example, 
Maryland, New Jersey, Connecticut, and New York came in first, second, 
third, and thirteenth, respectively, in the nation in the overall percentage of 
tax returns that itemized in 2005.37 
While the SALT deduction has long been a part of the IRC, debate 
continues as to whether the deduction should continue and, if so, whether 
 
 29  JCT Overview, supra note 6, at 4.  See also 26 U.S.C. § 63(b). 
 30  JCT Overview, supra note 6, at 4.  In addition to increasing the amount the average 
taxpayer will get to deduct, the new standard deduction provision will allow for greater 
deductions for the elderly and blind.  Id.  By Joint Committee on Taxation calculations, it 
will be an additional deduction of $2,600 or $3,200 as applicable for those taxpayer groups.  
Id.  
 31  Chenxi Lu, Itemized Deductions, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Jan. 27, 2017), 
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/itemized-deductions/full. 
 32  JCT Overview, supra note 6, at 4.   
 33  Id.   
 34  ALAN PRIGAL, 1 RABKIN & JOHNSON, FED. TAX GUIDEBOOK § 1.03 (2019), 
LexisNexis. 
 35  26 U.S.C. § 164(a) (2018); see also id. §164(b)(5)(B).   
 36  Scott Ahroni et al., Congress and the SALT Deduction Past, Present, and Future, 
CPA J. (Jan. 2018), https://www.cpajournal.com/2018/01/22/congress-salt-deduction/.  See 
also Gerald Prante, Most Americans Don’t Itemize on Their Tax Returns, TAX FOUND. 1 
(July 23, 2007), https://files.taxfoundation.org/legacy/docs/ff95.pdf. This fact will have 
particular impact on the current legal challenge to the law.  See discussion infra Part VI. 
 37  Prante, supra note 36, at 1. 
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full deductibility is still justified.38  On the one hand, opponents of the 
SALT deduction’s inclusion in the tax code argue that these deductions are 
really just payments for personal services received and, therefore, should 
not be deductible.39  This argument relies on the assumption that those 
taxpayers in high-tax states are receiving more and/or better services and 
should have to pay accordingly.40  There is also the concern that allowing 
the deduction cuts against the federalist make-up of our government based 
on the idea that, if states are allowed higher spending through what is 
essentially a federal subsidy (in the form of this deduction), there will be 
decreased ability for federal spending.41  Finally, there is the argument that, 
as with any deduction, it benefits the wealthy more than any other group of 
taxpayers.42  This argument relies on the assumption that those with a 
greater wherewithal to pay should be taxed accordingly.43  Therefore, the 
tax system should target benefits towards those with lower incomes. 
On the other side of the debate, proponents of the SALT deduction 
argue that because these taxes are not really disposable income, disallowing 
the deduction would equate to double taxation, as taxpayers are being taxed 
on the same income twice.44  Additionally, there is the idea, fundamental to 
the US tax structure, that similarly situated taxpayers should be taxed 
similarly.45  If two people in the same income bracket, but in different 
states, were paying differing amounts of state tax, they would not be taxed 
similarly.  Further, on the other side of the federalism argument entertained 
by the SALT deduction’s opponents, disallowing deductibility would 
reduce a high-tax state resident’s wherewithal to pay high state and local 
 
 38  See Brian Galle, Federal Fairness to State Taxpayers: Irrationality, Unfunded 
Mandates, and the “SALT” Deduction, 106 MICH. L. REV. 805, 807 (2008). 
 39  Id. at 808.  See also Louis Kaplow, Fiscal Federalism and the Deductibility of State 
and Local Taxes Under the Federal Income Tax, 82 VA. L. REV. 413, 422 (1996) 
(articulating the view held by some commenters that the more related to services received 
the more like consumption and, thus, ineligible for a deduction).  
 40  Kaplow, supra note 39, at 422.   
 41  Galle, supra note 38, at 809.  See also Kirk J. Stark, Fiscal Federalism and Tax 
Progressivity: Should the Federal Income Tax Encourage State and Local Redistribution?, 
51 UCLA L. REV. 1389, 1411 (2004).   
 42  See Gladriel Shobe, Disaggregating the State and Local Tax Deduction, 35 VA. TAX 
REV. 327, 335 (2016).  The value of a deduction to a taxpayer is the amount times the rate at 
which their last dollar is taxed.  See Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, The Tax 
Expenditure Concept and the Budget Reform Act of 1974, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 
679, 693 n.43 (1976). Because higher income will result in the last dollar taxed at a higher 
amount, the value of the deduction will be higher for those with more income.  See id.  This 
concept is usually referred to as an “upside-down” subsidy.  See id.  
 43  See Surrey & McDaniel, supra note 42, at 693. 
 44  Ahroni, supra note 36.  
 45  Galle, supra note 38, at 807.  But see Randall J. Gingiss, Forcing Tax Fairness in 
State Taxation, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 41, 52 (2007) (arguing that fairness cuts the other way 
and the deduction forces those in low-tax states to subsidize those in high-tax states).   
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taxes.46  This deprives the states of revenue and limits their ability to run 
their governments in a manner of their choosing.  In the same vein, it is 
argued that eliminating the SALT deduction could lead to a less 
progressive state tax system, as it would inhibit states’ ability to tax their 
very wealthy.47  Finally, there is the argument that these higher taxes are 
paid for receipt of services.  The counterargument, however, is that those 
with higher incomes or higher property values living in the same locality as 
taxpayers with lower income and lower property values receive the same 
services.48  Thus, state and local taxes cannot truly be said to be received 
for services.49 
Irrespective of which argument is ultimately correct, lawmakers have 
clearly felt that preserving the deduction serves the aims of taxation, as it 
has remained an enduring component of the American tax system since the 
first federal income tax in 1913.50  To illustrate, in 2015, of the thirty 
percent of taxpayers that itemized, ninety-five percent of them utilized the 
SALT deduction.51  Considering the endurance and importance of this 
deduction, any change to it merits careful examination for any unintended 
consequences it may cause, as well as the clear impact it will have on 
taxpayers and localities. 
III. OLD LAW VERSUS NEW LAW 
In order to understand the impact of the cap, it is important to first 
analyze how the TCJA changed the SALT deduction and also the intent 
behind both the new and the old versions of the SALT deduction.  Section 
A will look at the IRC’s treatment of the SALT deduction prior to the 
TCJA and Section B will examine the legislative intent behind the prior 
law.  Section C will examine the IRC’s treatment of the SALT deduction 
after the TCJA’s enactment and Section D will discuss the legislative intent 
behind the TCJA and the SALT deduction amendment. 
A. Pre-TCJA SALT Deduction 
Formerly, section 164 of the IRC explained that: 
 
 46  Tracy Gordon, The Price We Pay for Capping the SALT Deduction, TAX POL’Y CTR. 
(Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/price-we-pay-capping-salt-
deduction. 
 47  Id.   
 48  Kaplow, supra note 39, at 423.   
 49  Id.  
 50  Julianna Surane, Legislative History of The SALT Deduction, A.B.A. SEC. TAX’N 
2018 MID-YEAR MEETING, SAN DIEGO 1–2 (2018), https://www.americanbar.org/content/da 
m/aba/events/taxation/taxiq/mid18/taxiq-18mid-tps-perspectives-lang-paper.pdf.   
 51  Lori Robertson, The Facts on the SALT Deduction, FACTCHECK.ORG (Nov. 9, 2017), 
https://www.factcheck.org/2017/11/facts-salt-deduction/. 
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[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section, the following 
taxes shall be allowed as a deduction for the taxable year within 
which paid or accrued: (1) State and local, and foreign, real 
property taxes.  (2) State and local personal property taxes.  (3) 
State and local, and foreign, income, war profits, and excess 
profits taxes.  (4) The [general sales tax] imposed on income 
distributions. . . .52 
Personal property taxes are ad valorem, meaning those taxes are “based on 
criteria other than value,”53 and are imposed on an annual basis in respect 
to all personal property.54  State or local taxes are the taxes “imposed by a 
State, a possession of the United States, or a political subdivision of any of 
the foregoing, or by the District of Columbia.”55 
This section of the Code also provids that taxpayers can deduct state 
and local sales tax instead of state and local income tax.56  General sales tax 
is defined as “a tax imposed at one rate with respect to the sale at retail of a 
broad range of classes of items,” and there is no deduction for sales tax 
imposed “at a rate other than the general rate of tax” unless there is a lower 
tax rate in the case of food, clothing, medical supplies, and motor 
vehicles.57  Under this regime, there was no strict cap imposed on the 
amount of such taxes that could be deducted. 
B. Legislative Intent Behind Previous SALT Deduction 
The SALT deduction has been a part of the United States’ taxation 
scheme since the first federal income tax.58  Even before that, however, the 
Tariff Act of 1862 imposed a national tax.59  Intended to finance the Civil 
War efforts, the Tariff Act of 1862 provided for a tax on income and 
allowed certain deductions, one of which was for state and local taxes on 
property and income.60  In 1913, when the Sixteenth Amendment was 
ratified, removing the constitutional barrier to the federal income tax, the 
deductibility of state and local taxes remained.61  This included federal 
income tax, state income and property tax, and miscellaneous excises on 
 
 52  26 U.S.C. § 164(a) (2018). 
 53  7 MERTENS LAW OF FED. INCOME TAX’N § 27:7 (Westlaw 2019) [hereinafter 
MERTENS]. 
 54  26 U.S.C. § 164(b)(1). 
 55  Id. § 164(b)(2). 
 56  Id. § 164(b)(5)(A). 
 57  Id. § 164(b)(5)(B)–(D). 
 58  Surane, supra note 50, at 2.   
 59  Id.  
 60  Id.  See also Daniel Hemel, The Death and Life of the State and Local Tax 
Deduction, 72 TAX L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 3).   
 61  See Tariff of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, § II (B), 38 Stat. 114, 167 (1913). 
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liquor, tobacco, gasoline, and sales tax.62  The deduction for federal income 
tax was quickly eliminated in 1917, however.63 
In 1921, the Revenue Act provided for the general deductibility of 
taxes with a number of exceptions.64  This broadened the deduction by 
covering taxes not covered by specific exceptions under the prior regime.65  
Prior to 1942, the states lacked uniformity with regard to taxing methods, 
as some imposed different mixtures of property, income, and sales taxes.66  
In the 1942 Act, Congress responded to these variations by creating a 
deduction for state and local retail taxes.67  Further, with the highest 
brackets between the years 1942 and 1963 ranging anywhere from eighty-
eight to ninety-four percent, the deduction for state and local taxes was 
thought necessary to prevent taxes “from exceeding 100 percent” of 
income.68 
The Revenue Act of 1964 marked the first major, but ultimately 
unsuccessful, attack on the SALT deduction.69  It did, however, succeed in 
limiting the deduction further than any amendment had previously done, as 
it eliminated the deduction for miscellaneous taxes for excises on liquor 
and tobacco.70  Initially, Congress did feel that allowing the deduction of 
other state and local taxes was more burdensome for the taxpayers 
considering that these taxes were difficult to keep track of and there was a 
favorable tradeoff in sacrificing these deductions for a lower tax rate.71  
The final iteration of this bill, however, allowed the deduction of “state and 
local taxes on real property, personal property, income, general sales, and 
gasoline and other motor fuels.”72  This underscored their importance in 
preventing a shift of the federal tax burden between homeowners and non-
homeowners and avoided putting a heavy burden on the taxpayers.73  
Congress also slated the state and local gasoline tax for elimination in 
1978, but it ultimately survived after its proposed elimination faced strong 
dissent from those that feared the adverse impact it would have on the 
 
 62  ROBERT M. WILLAN, INCOME TAXES: CONCISE HISTORY AND PRIMER I-3 (1994).   
 63  Id. See generally Surane, supra note 50. 
 64  Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, §214(a)(3), 42 Stat. 227, 239–40 (1921). 
 65  See id.   
 66  MERTENS, supra note 53, § 27:2.  See also Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, 
56 Stat. 798 (1942).  
 67  MERTENS, supra note 53, § 27:2.  
 68  Surane, supra note 50, at 4. 
 69  WILLAN, supra note 62, at I-3.  See generally Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-
272, § 207, 78 Stat. 19, 40–43 (1964). 
 70  WILLAN, supra note 62, at I-3.   
 71  Surane, supra note 50, at 5.   
 72  Surane, supra note 50, at 6.  
 73  Surane, supra note 50, at 4–5. 
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middle-income taxpayers who itemized.74 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 ushered in the biggest change to both 
the tax code and the SALT deduction prior to the TCJA.75 The goals of this 
reform were purportedly simplicity, fairness, and growth and would entail a 
decrease in tax rates with an attempt to broaden the tax base.76  President 
Reagan initially proposed elimination of the SALT deduction, as he felt the 
federal government was essentially subsidizing state and local cost 
expenditures and that this would be a good way to broaden the tax base.77  
Opponents of the SALT deduction also felt that there were equitable 
concerns, in that this deduction was more beneficial to those in high-tax 
states.78  Additionally, there was no longer the need for the deduction to 
prevent the tax rate from going over 100 percent that there previously was, 
as the rates were being lowered at this time.79  Finally, opponents of the 
SALT deduction argued that this was not double taxation because 
taxpayers could change the amount of local taxes they paid either through 
elections or by moving out of that jurisdiction.80 
Arguments against repealing the deduction focused on the fact that it 
both indirectly benefitted the poor and directly benefitted middle-income 
taxpayers.81  Lawmakers were also concerned about these changes 
incentivizing residents to move to low-tax jurisdictions.82  Both sides 
expressed concerns, on the one hand about how the influx would burden 
the system and on the other, how less residents would affect the high-tax 
states’ economies.83  Congress ultimately considered both that the 
deduction lowered voter resistance to higher taxes and that these higher 
taxes provided beneficial social services,84 and in the end, found the SALT 
deduction valuable enough to retain to a large extent, keeping all but state 
and local sales tax deductions.85 
The Joint Committee on Taxation stated that this change was justified 
 
 74  Surane, supra note 50, at 6–7. 
 75  See generally Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).   
 76  Federal Income Tax Deduction for State and Local Taxes: Hearing Before the S. 
Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 99th 
Cong. 1 (1985) [hereinafter “Senate Hearings 1985”]; STAFF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 99TH 
CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION ON THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, 47–48 (Comm. Print 
1987) [hereinafter “JCT Bluebook”]. 
 77  Senate Hearings 1985, supra note 76, at 36.  See also Surane, supra note 50, at 7–8. 
 78  Senate Hearings 1985, supra note 76, at 36–37. 
 79  Surane, supra note 50, at 7.  
 80  Surane, supra note 50, at 8. 
 81  Senate Hearings 1985, supra note 76, at 50, 88. 
 82  Senate Hearings 1985, supra note 76, at 18–19. 
 83  Senate Hearings 1985, supra note 76, at 20. 
 84  Surane, supra note 50, at 9. 
 85  JCT Bluebook, supra note 76, at 7. 
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by improved consistency and the unfairness of the deduction on sales tax 
because it favored certain consumption patterns.86  This change did not last, 
however.  In 2004, the SALT provisions would again allow an election 
between the deduction of the general sales tax and income tax.87  The new 
election created a more equitable system that took into account the different 
states’ methods of taxing.88 
Thus, throughout its history, the SALT deduction has focused on 
striking a balance of fairness across states, while also minimizing the 
burden the middle-class would face because of taxation at the state and 
federal level.  Up until the TCJA, however, the latter concern was the usual 
winner. 
C. Post-TCJA SALT Deduction 
The revised section 164 under the TCJA provides, in the relevant part, 
“for years 2018–2025 the aggregate amounts accounted for under 
paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of subsection (a) and paragraph (5) for any 
taxable year shall not exceed $10,000, or $5,000 in the case of a married 
individual filing separately.”89  In other words, an individual’s state, local, 
and foreign real property taxes; state and local personal property taxes; and 
state and local and foreign, income, war profits, and excess profit taxes and 
general sales taxes are only deductible up to $10,000 or $5,000, depending 
on filing status.90 
In essence, taxpayers went from being able to deduct the full amount 
of their state and local property and income taxes under section 164 to 
being capped at $10,000 regardless of their AGI or other unique tax 
features. While this provision will phase out in 2025,91 it could create 
problems in the intervening years.92 
D. Legislative Intent Behind the TCJA 
The main goals behind the TCJA were “bringing tax cuts for 
hardworking, middle-income Americans; eliminating unfair loopholes and 
deductions; and slashing business taxes so employers can create jobs, raise 
wages, and dominate their competition around the world.”93  In fact, these 
 
 86  Id.  
 87  MERTENS, supra note 53, § 27:2; Hemel, supra note 60, at 5. 
 88  MERTENS, supra note 53, § 27:2.  
 89  26 U.S.C. § 164(b)(6) (2018).  
 90  Id.  
 91  Id.  
 92  Additionally, TCJA Phase 2 could make these changes permanent if passed.  Renu 
Zaretsky, TCJA Phase 2 and a Tariff Affirmation, TAX POL’Y CTR. (July 25, 2018), 
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/daily-deduction/tcja-phase-2-and-tariff-affirmation. 
 93  Press Release, Donald Trump, Statement from the President on the Tax Cuts and 
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tax goals were foreshadowed by speeches that President Trump made on 
his campaign trail.94 
These goals played a prominent role in discussions when the TCJA 
finally came before Congress.95  Specifically, discussions behind the SALT 
provision centered around striking a balance of fairness to the middle-class 
and fairness among states.96  While these two were separate themes to an 
extent, there was a lot of interaction between them.97  Generally, the cap on 
the SALT deduction will affect the middle-class more in states with higher 
income taxes and higher property values than it will in lower income states 
with lower property values because it is unlikely that this cap would affect 
many outside the high-income earners in the lower income states.98  In 
congressional discussions, tensions arose between low- and high-tax states, 
with low-tax states arguing that higher taxes were simply payment by the 
taxpayers for receiving the more plentiful services the high-tax states 
provide, such as free garbage pick-up, better roads, and better education 
systems.99  On the other side of that, though, senators from high-tax states 
pushed back because of the very real impact the cap would have on 
residents of those states, many of them middle-income-earners.100  In 
making these arguments, the senators underscored the fact that businesses 
would not face this cap and the fact that much of the money paid by high-
tax state taxpayers went towards subsidizing low-tax states.101 
 
Jobs Act (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-
president-tax-cuts-jobs-act/. 
 94  See, e.g., Donald Trump, Remarks to the Detroit Economic Club (Aug. 8, 2016) 
(discussing plans for tax reform to benefit middle-class tax payers and the simplification of 
tax preparation); Donald Trump, Remarks to the Economic Club of New York at the 
Waldorf Astoria in New York City (Sept. 15, 2016) (discussing tax effect on families and 
complexity of tax preparation).   
 95  See generally 163 CONG. REC. S7653 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 2017); 163 CONG. REC. 
S7507, 7542 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 2017); 163 CONG. REC. H9602 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 2017); 163 
CONG. REC. H9380 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2017).   
 96  163 CONG. REC. S7653, 7663, 7682 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 2017).  
 97  163 CONG. REC. S7507, 7542 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 2017).  
 98  Id. 
 99  Id. at 7542 (Senator Toomey of Pennsylvania questioned “how it could possibly be 
fair to force [his] constituents . . . [that] have relatively modest services and pay a modest 
amount of taxes [to] pay more in income taxes to subsidize someone who gets to live in a 
multimillion dollar condo in the Upper West Side of Manhattan.”). 
 100  163 CONG. REC. S7653, 7663, 7662–63 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 2017) (Senator Menendez 
of New Jersey underscored that “[i]n 2015 alone, nearly 1.8 million New Jersey households 
deducted a combined $32 billion in State, local, and property taxes from their Federal tax 
bill.  These families aren’t living large.  These are middle-class folks who had to work hard 
for every dollar they have.”). 
 101  Id. at 7663 (Senator Menendez of New Jersey pointing out that if the SALT 
deduction is important enough to be preserved for businesses, “Republicans should 
understand why it is so important for middle class families.”).  See also 163 CONG. REC. 
H9602, 9607 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 2017); 163 CONG. REC. H9380, 9392 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 
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Based on these discussions, it appears that the main intent of the 
SALT cap provision, as enacted, is to avoid inordinately burdening middle- 
and lower-income taxpayers, while simultaneously preventing high-tax 
states from shifting the cost of the services they provide to their residents 
onto the federal government or other states.102  The contrary position is that 
this cap will unduly burden certain groups of taxpayers and create 
unintended consequences for those taxpayers and the country at large. 
Finally, on the federal level, there is the concern of bringing in enough 
revenue to support the government. Considering the other numerous 
changes enacted in this legislation that have the potential to decrease 
revenue, provisions to counteract that are of great importance.  Overall, in 
light of both these concerns and justifications, Congress enacted the cap.103 
IV. IMPACT OF THE TAX REFORM 
While it is unclear exactly what the impact of the SALT deduction cap 
will be, projections envision the effects reaching taxpayers, both 
individuals and corporations, as well as governmental bodies.104  Section A 
will look at the impact of the cap on taxpayers and Section B will look at 
the impact on governmental agencies. 
A. Impact on Taxpayers 
Among taxpayers, the deduction cap will have different implications 
because the SALT deduction remains in full force for businesses, while it is 
limited to $10,000 for individual taxpayers.105  Subsection 1 will look at the 
anticipated impact on individuals and subsection 2 will look at the 
anticipated impact for corporations. 
1. Individuals 
Clearly, the reform will mean a higher tax bill for some taxpayers.106  
For example, thirteen percent of New York taxpayers, eleven percent of 
New Jersey taxpayers, twelve percent of Maryland taxpayers, and nine 
percent of Connecticut taxpayers will see a tax hike in 2019.107 
 
 
2017).   
 102  163 CONG. REC. S7653, 7542 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 2017).  
 103  Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, supra note 4, at 2085–86. 
 104  See infra Parts IV.A and IV.B.  
 105  26 U.S.C. § 164(b)(6) (2018). 
 106  The Final Trump-GOP Tax Bill: National & 50-State Analysis, INST. TAX’N & ECON. 
POL’Y tbl. 2 (Dec. 2017), https://itep.org/wp-content/uploads/Trump-GOP-Final-Bill-
Report.pdf.  
 107  Id.   
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Representative Josh Gottheimer of New Jersey expects the SALT cap 
to “kill” property values in his state.108  According to Moody’s Analytics, 
Essex County, New Jersey is anticipated to be among one of the hardest hit 
counties affected by the new tax law.109  Essex County has a median 
household income of $76,000 but residents pay on average more than 
$10,000 in property tax.110  Thus, many of those who will experience a tax 
increase are middle-income taxpayers, as well. 
Moody’s Analytics is also anticipating the cap to impact home prices 
nationally by 2019, with home prices four percent lower than if there were 
no tax bill.111  Furthermore, would-be homeowners may be hesitant to 
purchase because of the increased cost of maintaining a home.112  This also 
means decreased construction as fewer people build homes, especially in 
high-tax areas.113  While the impact of the TCJA will be national, some 
areas like California and the Northeast will bear more of the burden.114 
Some also anticipate diminished job growth and possibly fewer jobs 
in high-tax areas, outside just the loss of construction jobs.  Comparing “11 
high-tax states . . . with 20 low-tax states . . . shows that private sector job 
growth in the first six months of the year [since the TCJA] is 80 percent 
higher in the low-tax states.”115  This is likely not directly due to the SALT 
deduction cap, as these taxes still remain deductible as an expense for 
businesses, but rather it is a result of the new tax provisions generally.116  
The response could also be in anticipation of higher taxes leading to 
decreased disposable income.117  This means that taxpayers in the high-tax 
states will have less to spend on non-necessities and businesses anticipate 
this shift in spending abilities.  Regardless, it is likely to heavily impact 
 
 108  Michelle Fox, Tax Bill Will Make Home Prices Plunge, Says NJ Congressman, 
CNBC (Dec. 5, 2017, 3:59 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/05/tax-bill-will-make-nj-
home-prices-plunge-says-rep-josh-gottheimer.html. 
 109  Aimee Picchi, Where the GOP Tax Bill Won’t Help: Housing Prices, CBS NEWS 
(Dec. 21, 2017, 1:46 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/gop-tax-bill-wont-help-housing-
prices/. 
 110  Id.  
 111  Andres Carbacho-Burgos & Mark Zandi, Housing Takes a Hit, MOODY’S ANALYTICS 
(2018), https://www.moodysanalytics.com/webinars-on-demand/2018/housing-takes-a-hit. 
 112  Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 26, New York v. Mnuchin, No. 18-CV-6427 (JPO), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
168754 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 2019) [hereinafter Opposition]. 
 113  Id. 
 114  Id.  
 115  Chuck DeVore, New York and Other High-Tax States Sue Over SALT Deduction 
Cap While Jobs Follow Lower Taxes, FORBES (July 26, 2018, 5:57 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/chuckdevore/2018/07/26/new-york-and-other-high-tax-states-
sue-over-salt-deduction-cap-while-jobs-follow-lower-taxes/. 
 116  Id.  
 117  Id.  
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taxpayers in high-tax states because there will be higher taxes with less 
opportunity for financial growth.118 
2. Corporations 
Because the SALT deduction cap does not apply to corporations, 
which can still deduct state and local taxes as a business expense,119 states 
and localities may be incentivized to place a higher proportion of the SALT 
burden on those businesses.  Additionally, as discussed above, taxpayers in 
high-tax states will have less disposable income because of their increased 
tax bills.120  This may already be reflected in the increasingly bad business 
climates in certain high-tax states, like New York, New Jersey, and 
Connecticut.121 
There is also the potential harm to charities and nonprofit corporations 
because of the TCJA.122  First, there is the fear that if state and local 
governments have to cut spending, these organizations will receive fewer 
funds.123  Charities are also concerned that, because of recent Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) guidance regarding charitable contribution 
workarounds for the cap, individuals will donate less money.124 
B. Impact on Governmental Agencies 
While the diminished growth in business will impact taxpayers, it is 
likely to have a greater impact on state governments.  As businesses are 
more likely to move to low-tax states, the high-tax states will lose these 
major sources of tax revenue.125  Further, while states and localities could 
previously provide tax incentives to retain these businesses, in the wake of 
the harm that the SALT deduction cap will cause states and localities may 
have to prioritize individual tax incentives instead.126 
 
 118  Id. 
 119  26 U.S.C. § 164(b)(6)(B) (2018). 
 120  See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 121  See Jared Walczak et al., 2019 State Business Tax Climate Index, TAX FOUND. (Sept. 
26, 2018), https://taxfoundation.org/publications/state-business-tax-climate-index/. 
 122  See National Council of Nonprofits, Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, H.R. 1 Nonprofit 
Analysis of the Final Tax Law, COUNCIL OF NONPROFITS (Apr. 5, 2018), 
https://www.councilofnonprofits.org/sites/default/files/documents/tax-bill-summary-
chart.pdf. 
 123  Id.  
 124  See discussion infra Part V. 
 125  See Walczak, supra note 121, at 9–10.  
 126  See, e.g., Howard Gleckman, Could States Fix the SALT Deduction Cap by Taxing 
Pass-Throughs and Giving Their Owners a Credit?, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Feb. 27, 2018), 
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/could-states-fix-salt-deduction-cap-taxing-pass-
throughs-and-giving-their-owners-credit (discussing a similar idea as applied to pass-
through entities). 
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Another impact on the high-tax states will be a loss of residents.127  
For example, New Jersey, Connecticut, and New York had some of the 
highest outbound migration rates for 2018, with tax policy decisions 
playing a factor.128  In the future, without being able to deduct the full 
amount of the SALT being paid, more high-income residents may seek to 
move to low-tax states.129  This will create problems for the high-tax states 
because it will mean a smaller revenue base.130  This will force high-tax 
states into the solution they may have sought to avoid, namely cutting the 
services they provide.131  On the other side, the influx of high-tax state 
residents into other states will strain the resources of those states, which are 
limited by their low tax rates.132 
There is also the concern for the national economy, as economists 
predict “that if fewer Americans moved to places like New York City and 
the San Francisco Bay Area the US economy would shrink by about 9 
percent a year . . . .”133  Thus, the impact is not limited to just high-tax 
states, but to the nation as a whole. 
V. LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS BY STATES TO MITIGATE THE CAP 
With New York as the trailblazer and New Jersey and Connecticut 
following suit, states have been enacting different forms of legislation to 
try to mitigate the effect of the SALT cap on their taxpayers.134  Noticeably, 
these are all high-tax states that are likely to feel the effects of the cap most 
harshly and include the bulk of the states currently suing the federal 
government over this cap.135  Part A will discuss the first form of 
legislation—the payroll workaround—and Part B will look at the second 
form of legislation—the charitable contribution workaround. 
 
 
 127  See DeVore, supra note 115. 
 128  Katherine Loughead, Where Did Americans Move in 2018?, TAX FOUND. (Jan. 3, 
2019), https://taxfoundation.org/where-did-americans-move-in-2018/. 
 129  Id.  
 130  See DeVore, supra note 115. 
 131  Id.   
 132  In fact, this concern was voiced by a Senator from Florida, which lacks a state 
income tax, back when the SALT deduction came on the chopping block in 1986.  See 
Senate Hearings 1985, supra note 76.  This still remains a concern today.   
 133  Gordon, supra note 46. 
 134  Frank Sammartino, How New York State Responded to the SALT Deduction Limit, 
TAX POL’Y CTR. (May 14, 2018), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/how-new-york-
state-responded-salt-deduction-limit. 
 135  See infra Part VI.  
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A. Payroll Tax Workaround 
One of the options available to taxpayers in New York is to give 
employers the choice to collect and pay a five percent payroll tax for 
employees with more than $40,000 in annual wages.136  This would reduce 
the taxpayers’ wages but it would also enable employees to take a tax credit 
that would be subtracted from their taxes payable.137 
To illustrate, if a taxpayer had a salary of $100,000 and paid state 
income tax on this of $10,000, the employer would be permitted to reduce 
the employees’ pay to $90,000, leaving him with the same tax base he 
would have had if his state tax was fully deductible.138  The state would 
then assess a corresponding income tax on the employer of $10,000 that the 
employer would be legally obligated to pay.139  Finally, the taxpayer would 
get either a credit against his state income tax for the amount of that payroll 
tax or he could reduce his state income tax base by the amount of salary 
that is subject to the new payroll tax.140  By swapping employees’ pay for 
an income tax credit, this plan would keep states’ revenues essentially 
unchanged and would not largely impact the taxpayer’s income.141  
Although it would decrease the amount of income the taxpayer took home, 
he would pay less federal income and payroll tax.142  Businesses would not 
be harshly impacted either because they would be able to deduct the 
amount as a business expense.143  Finally, by limiting this option to those 
earnings above $40,000, the legislation ensures that the taxpayers will be 
eligible for the tax credit.144  New York has been the only state thus far to 




 136  Employer Compensation Expense Program, 2018 N.Y. LAWS 59, § 852 (LexisNexis 
2018).  See also Rodha Mohan & Lai King Lam, Why IRS Will Struggle to Respond to State 
SALT Cap Bypass, LAW360 (May 31, 2018), https://www.law360.com/newjersey/articles/10 
48972/why-irs-will-struggle-to-respond-to-state-salt-cap-bypass; Joseph C. Mandarino, 
Evaluation of Efforts to Combat the SALT Deduction Cap, 158 ST. TAX NOTES 689, 691 
(Feb. 19, 2018), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-state/charitable-giving/evaluation-effo 
rts-combat-salt-deduction-cap/2018/02/19/26sz8?highlight=Evaluation%20of%20Efforts%2 
0to%20Combat%20the%20SALT%20Deduction%20Cap. 
 137  Mandarino, supra note 136, at 691. 
 138  Id.  
 139  Id.  
 140  Id.  
 141  Id. 
 142  Id. 
 143  Mandarino, supra note 136, at 691. 
 144  Sammartino, supra note 134.   
 145  Id. See also Employer Compensation Expense Program, 2018 N.Y. Laws 59, § 852 
(LexisNexis 2018).   
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While this legislation is less likely to run afoul of the IRS, it relies 
completely upon employer participation.146  At the moment, it appears to 
have little traction with that group.147  This may be because it offers no real 
incentive to participate.148  It could also be that, if the IRS were to issue 
guidance disallowing this structure, it could create a headache for the 
companies that have participated.  This also presents problems in figuring 
out the burden to match to the withholding149 and would cause 
administrative difficulties for the IRS, for companies involved, and 
possibly for the taxpayers that utilize this method.  These difficulties could 
translate into increased preparation costs for taxes.  Finally, workers may 
be reluctant to take advantage of this program because it will mean a 
smaller paycheck.150 
B. Charitable Contributions Tax Workaround 
Under the charitable contribution workaround, which has been 
enacted by New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut in one form or 
another, the states create state-administered trust funds, to which residents 
can contribute.151  Taxpayers that contribute receive a credit against their 
state income taxes equal to a set percentage of their contribution in the year 
after the contribution.152  States can offer full-credit programs, that allow 
taxpayers a dollar-for-dollar credit for amounts paid.153  Alternatively, 
states can offer partial credit, granting taxpayers credits for less than 100 
percent of their charitable contributions or the states can offer a private 
credit model, in which taxpayers give to private organizations to receive 
credit.154  So far, no state has offered a full-credit option and the partial-
credit method seems to be the predominant method in attempting to get 
around the SALT deduction cap.155 
 
 
 146  See Sammartino, supra note 134. 
 147  Id. 
 148  Id.  
 149  Mandarino, supra note 136, at 691. 
 150  Id. 
 151  See 2018 N.Y. Laws 59 § 850 (LexisNexis 2018) (New York); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
54:4-66.9 (LexisNexis 2018) (New Jersey); 2018 Conn. Acts 49 (LexisNexis 2018) 
(Connecticut).  See Timothy M. Todd, Exogeneity vs. Endogeneity in Section 170’s Quid 
Pro Quo Test, 161 TAX NOTES 65, 66–67 (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-
notes-state/tax-policy/exogeneity-vs-endogeneity-section-170s-quid-pro-quo-
test/2018/10/01/28d98; Amandeep Grewal, The Charitable Contribution Strategy: An 
Ineffective SALT Substitute, 38 VA. TAX REV. 203, 205–09 (2018). 
 152  Todd, supra note 151, at 38. 
 153  Grewal, supra note 151, at 208–10. 
 154  Grewal, supra note 151, at 208–09.  
 155  Id. 
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The idea behind this plan is that, while there are limits to the 
charitable contribution deduction taxpayers are allowed to take in the new 
tax code, the limits are much higher than the $10,000 deduction allowed for 
SALT.156  By “donating” the money to a charitable fund instead of paying 
the same amount via taxes, taxpayers would be able to deduct it as a 
charitable contribution.157  On the state and local end, the preference for 
partial credit is predicated on the idea that keeping the deduction below 100 
percent allows the states to make up for the increased administrative 
expenses.158  Even though the taxpayer does not receive credit for the full 
amount, they still receive considerable benefits.159 
Many states have used this method to provide credits for taxpayer 
contributions to or for the use of entities listed under the charitable 
contribution section of the code previously.160  Prior to these SALT 
workarounds, there was no official ruling or position either for or against 
these credits by the IRS, and informal guidance had been on the side of 
allowing these credits.161  This new state legislation, however, would 
expand these provisions to a place likely not contemplated by the informal 
guidance.  Therefore, in June 2018, the Treasury Department and the IRS 
announced their intention to regulate treatment of these contributions based 
on “longstanding federal tax law principles.”162 
The IRS issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to disallow the 
charitable contribution workaround stating that, “[a] payment of money 
generally cannot constitute a charitable contribution if the contributor 
expects a substantial benefit in return.”163  The IRS recognized the dual 
character of some payments, even where the taxpayer receives a “nominal 
benefit” less than the value of the payment.164  The IRS’s position allows 
the deduction “but only to the extent the amount donated or the fair market 
value of the property transferred by the taxpayer exceeds the fair market 
value of the benefit received in return, and only if the excess amount was 
 
 156  Amandeep Grewal, The Proposed SALT Regulations May Be Doomed, 103 IOWA L. 
REV. ONLINE 75, 75 (2018).  See also 26 U.S.C. § 170(b) (2018) (setting the limitations on 
individual’s charitable contribution deduction, with cash contributions being limited to 60% 
of the taxpayer’s AGI and contributions of capital gains property being limited to 30% of 
AGI subject to other additional limitations).  
 157  Grewal, supra note 156, at 75. 
 158  Sammartino, supra note 134.  
 159  Id.  
 160  Grewal, supra note 151, at 205, 210.  
 161  Grewal, supra note 151, at 211–12. 
 162  Contributions in Exchange for State or Local Tax Credits, 83 Fed. Reg. 43,563, 
43,565 (Aug. 27, 2018) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) [hereinafter IRS Guidance]. 
 163  Id. at 43,563 (quoting United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 116 
(1986)). 
 164  Id.  
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transferred with the intent of making a gift.”165  This means that very few, 
if any, transfers under this workaround will actually qualify for charitable 
deductibility. 
The IRS also addressed the fact that many of these states have offered 
credits for charitable contributions prior to this legislation.166  The IRS, 
however, noted that, because there was no cap on the SALT deduction in 
those systems, the increased charitable contribution deduction necessarily 
entailed a decreased SALT deduction because the taxpayers were receiving 
credits lowering their state and local tax bills.167  Therefore, there was no 
tangible difference.  Under new legislation, this system would enable 
taxpayers to get around legislatively enacted limits in a way that was not a 
concern before.168 
In light of this, the Treasury Department and the IRS stated that 
“when a taxpayer receives or expects to receive a state or local tax credit in 
return for a payment or transfer to any entity listed in section 170(c) [the 
charitable contribution deduction section], the receipt of this tax benefit 
constitutes a quid pro quo that may preclude a full deduction.”169  These 
rules would apply regardless of whether the taxpayer was taking advantage 
of a pre-existing charitable contribution provision or one enacted in the 
wake of the newest tax reform.170  Thus, the rule going forward is that “the 
amount otherwise deductible as a charitable contribution must generally be 
reduced by the amount of the state or local tax credit received or expected 
to be received.”171  This effectively eliminates all benefits the states are 
attempting to bestow on their taxpayers and makes the new SALT 
workaround provisions useless with respect to their intended purpose.172 
The IRS’s proposed regulation is already concerning many parties, as 
it implicates not only the credits given related to the SALT workaround, 
but also the credit programs that were in place before.173  Many states that 
have utilized these credits in the past have written to the Treasury 
Department and the IRS raising concerns regarding the probable effects on 
 
 165  Id. (citing United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 117 (1986)).  
 166  Id. at 43,564. 
 167  Id.  
 168  IRS Guidance, supra note 162, at 43,565. 
 169  Id.  
 170  Id.  
 171  Id.  
 172  Id. But see Joseph Bankman et al., State Responses to Federal Tax Reform: 
Charitable Tax Credits, 87 ST. TAX NOTES 433 (2018) (arguing that this approach goes 
against the weight of legal authority as the value of the deduction has not been treated as an 
item of income under section 61). 
 173  IRS Guidance, supra note 162, at 43,571. 
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organizations and taxpayers in the states.174  Particularly notable is the 
tension between states that have attempted to newly implement 
workarounds and those that have pre-existing state tax credit schemes 
caught in the crosshairs.175  Charitable organizations have also expressed 
their concerns over the anticipated decrease in contributions.176  The 
proposed changes, however, have found support to the extent that they 
prevent states from circumventing the SALT cap in place, and also for the 
reallocation of values caused by the disallowance of pre-existing credits.177  
Thus, even attempts to clarify have left numerous holes in the general 
understanding of section 170 deductions and how the IRS will actually 
apply the new rule remains uncertain.178 
VI. JUDICIAL ATTEMPT BY STATES TO MITIGATE CAP 
In July 2018, four states—New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, and 
Maryland—(collectively the “Plaintiff States”) filed suit against Steven 
Mnuchin, in his official capacity as the Secretary of the U.S. Department of 
the Treasury; the U.S. Department of Treasury; David Kautter, in his 
official capacity as the Acting Commissioner of the IRS; the IRS; and, 
finally, the United States itself (collectively the “Defendants”).179  The suit 
was brought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
 
 174  See Letter from Andrew Cuomo, Governor, State of N.Y., to Charles P. Rettig, 
Comm’r, IRS (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/ato 
ms/files/RettigLetter2018.pdf; Letter from Michael Hartman, Exec. Dir., Colo. Dep’t 
Revenue, to the IRS (Oct. 11, 2018), https://s3.amazonaws.com/pdfs.taxnotes.com/2018/201 
8-40988_xColorado-DOR-salt.pdf. 
 175  Compare Letter from Rob Woodall, Member of Cong., et al., to Steven T. Mnuchin 
et al. (Oct. 11, 2018), https://woodall.house.gov/sites/woodall.house.gov/files/wysiwyg_upl 
oaded/Letter%20to%20Treaury%20and%20IRS%20on%20Proposed%20Rule.pdf, with 
Letter from Andrew Cuomo to Charles P. Rettig, supra note 174. 
 176  Letter from Kristi Knous, President, Cmty. Found. of Greater Des Moines, et al., to 
the IRS (Oct. 11, 2018), https://s3.amazonaws.com/pdfs.taxnotes.com/2018/2018-
41102_2018-10-11-Hamond-Jeff-in.pdf. 
 177  See Letter from Rob Woodall to Steven T. Mnuchin, supra note 175; Letter from 
Cindi McDonald, Superintendent, Waukee Cmty. Sch. to Merrill Feldstein, Senior Counsel, 
IRS (Sept. 13, 2018), https://s3.amazonaws.com/pdfs.taxnotes.com/2018/2018-42888_x_01 
45_-for-regs-schools-WCS-_Cindi-McDonald_.pdf (supporting the new guidance because it 
will disincentivize contributions to private schools over public schools). 
 178  See generally Todd, supra note 151.  Todd argues that the IRS should make an 
exogenous-endogenous distinction when determining deductibility, such that benefits that 
arise independently of or outside a specific taxing authority (exogenous) would reduce the 
deductible amount and benefits that arise from within a specific taxing authority 
(endogenous) would not be considered in determining deductibility.  Id.  This approach 
would solve at least one problem that plagues the new IRS guidance, in justifying the now 
contradictory system of allowing federal deductibility despite the quid pro quo nature of the 
federal deduction.  Id. 
 179  Complaint at 8–10, New York v. Mnuchin, No. 18-CV-6427 (JPO), 2019 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 168754 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 2019) [hereinafter Complaint]. 
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New York and was dismissed on September 30th, 2019.180  The Plaintiff 
States had been seeking a declaratory judgment stating that the new cap on 
SALT deductions violated the United States Constitution and an injunction 
to bar the cap’s enforcement.181  This part examines the issues the Plaintiff 
States faced with regard to jurisdiction and the merits of their claims.182  
Each subsection looks at the arguments advanced by both parties and the 
district court’s resolution of these arguments. 
A. Jurisdiction 
This section examines issues the Plaintiff States faced in regard to 
jurisdiction.  It will first examine the arguments put forth by the Plaintiff 
States and the Defendants and then examine the district court’s disposition 
of these issues. 
1. The Parties Arguments 
The Plaintiff States based their standing on the fact that they “and 
their residents will suffer legally cognizable harm because of the new cap 
on the SALT deduction, and an order invalidating the new cap would 
redress the Plaintiff States’ injuries.”183  While the complaint included 
allegations that could reasonably meet the minimum constitutional 
requirements for standing—namely injury, causation and 
redressability184—the Defendants’ motion to dismiss questioned whether 
the Plaintiff States themselves had suffered an injury in fact or whether 
their harm was secondary to that of their citizens.185  Further, the 
Defendants argued that even if the injury alleged was in fact an injury to 
 
 180  Id. at 1; New York v. Mnuchin, No. 18-CV-6427 (JPO), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
168754 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 2019). 
 181  Complaint, supra note 179, at 8.  The Defendants never filed a reply to the 
complaint.  Instead, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, both for lack of 
standing and for failing to state a claim for which relief can be granted.  Motion to Dismiss, 
New York v. Mnuchin, No. 18-CV-6427 (JPO), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168754 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sep. 30, 2019) [hereinafter Motion to Dismiss].  This motion is discussed throughout the 
remainder of Part VI.  The Plaintiff States replied to this and made a cross-motion for 
summary judgment, which will also be relied on throughout Part VI.  Opposition, supra note 
112.   
 182  As of the time of publication, it is unclear whether the Plaintiff States will appeal this 
decision, although New York’s governor has indicated it is a possibility.  Jonathan Stempel, 
Judge Dismisses U.S. States’ Challenge to Trump Tax Cap on SALT Deductions, REUTERS 
(Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-taxes-lawsuit/judge-dismisses-u-s-
states-challenge-to-trump-tax-cap-on-salt-deductions-idUSKBN1WF1OB?utm. 
 183  Complaint, supra note 179, at 9. 
 184  See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 515 (2006) (discussing these 
requirements for standing).  See also Complaint, supra note 179. 
 185  Motion to Dismiss, supra note 181, at 3–4. 
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the states, it was not concrete enough.186 
The Plaintiff States, in their reply to the Defendants, pointed to three 
particular, potential sovereign harms: (1) the cap would cause them to 
depart from their current taxation and fiscal policies; (2) it would cause the 
Plaintiff States to lose specific sources of revenue, like sales tax and real 
estate transfer taxes; and (3) because it targeted specific states, the principle 
of equal sovereign immunity was violated.187  In response, the Defendants 
argued that: (1) this tax does not force the states to make any choice, as 
they can keep taxing and spending as they wish and taxpayers will simply 
have a larger tax bill; (2) these revenue sources are not specific enough to 
confer standing; and (3) this tax does not treat states differently, but rather 
treats all taxpayers the same.188 
Both parties also addressed the issue of the political question doctrine.  
This doctrine is implicated when a policy determination is best left to 
branches of government other than the judiciary.189  The Defendants 
pointed to the “especially rigorous” standing inquiry used when the court 
must determine the constitutionality of another branches’ action.190  While 
the Plaintiff States attempted to contest this characterization, the 
Defendants argued the Plaintiff States ultimately failed to provide a 
standard by which to judge the fairness of the cap.191  Finally, the 
Defendants challenged the Plaintiff States’ request for injunctive relief.192  
The Defendants claimed that injunctive relief is barred by the Anti-
Injunctive Act (AIA), which provides that no suit to restrain the assessment 
or collection of any tax can be maintained by a court.193  Thus, overall the 
Plaintiff States faced numerous issues even showing the district court had 




 186  Motion to Dismiss, supra note 181, at 8–9.   
 187  Opposition, supra note 112, at 6–9. 
 188  Reply and Opposition to Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 3–6, New York v. 
Mnuchin, No. 18-CV-6427 (JPO), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168754 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 2019) 
[hereinafter Reply]. 
 189  Motion to Dismiss, supra note 181, at 4.  See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 
(1962) (discussing political questions as an impediment to standing).  
 190  Motion to Dismiss, supra note 181, at 10 (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 
568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013)). 
 191  Reply, supra note 188, at 8–9.  This is especially important because they did not 
claim that any cap on the SALT deduction would be invalid, just that this cap is invalid.  
Reply, supra note 188, at 9–10.   
 192  Motion to Dismiss, supra note 181, at 14. 
 193  Id.   
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2. District Court’s Resolution 
The district court ultimately found that the Plaintiff States had 
standing.194  It relied upon the Plaintiff States’ second alleged harm, namely 
that the cap could potentially cause the Plaintiff States to lose a specific 
source of revenue.195  The court relied upon Wyoming v. Oklahoma, in 
which the Supreme Court held that a state could establish a direct injury in 
the form of loss of a specific tax revenue.196  In this case, the Plaintiff 
States identified one such revenue in the form of real estate transfer 
taxes.197  The court further found that this allegation was not too 
speculative as there was “no reason to doubt the basic economic logic” of 
this prediction.198 
As to the political question doctrine, the district court pointed to the 
fact that the Plaintiff States were not asking the court to resolve a matter of 
opinion nor were they asking the court to make an unprecedented 
intervention in the political process.199  The Plaintiff States were simply 
asking the court to use familiar tools of constitutional interpretation.200  
Further, the lack of standard to judge the tax’s fairness went to the merits of 
the case.201  Thus, the doctrine was not implicated.  Finally, in regard to the 
AIA, the court found that the statute did not bar the Plaintiff States’ suit as 
Congress provided no other means to challenge this tax.202  Therefore, there 
was no jurisdictional bar to the Plaintiff States’ claims 
B. The Merits of the Plaintiff States’ Claims 
This subsection will examine the merits of the Plaintiff States’ claims, 
first by looking at their allegations, the Defendants’ response to those 
allegations, and any other case law that could impact the case if it does go 
forward.  This part will then look at the disposition of these claims by the 
district court. 
1. Sixteenth Amendment Argument 
The Sixteenth Amendment gives the federal government the power to 
collect income tax and reads, “[t]he Congress shall have power to lay and 
 
 194  New York v. Mnuchin, No. 18-CV-6427 (JPO), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168754, at 
*23 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2019).   
 195  Id. at *19. 
 196  Id. at *20 (citing Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992)). 
 197  Id. at *21. 
 198  Id. at *22. 
 199  Id. at *32–33. 
 200  Mnuchin, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168754, at *33. 
 201  Id.   
 202  Id. at *24–25 (citing South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367 (1984)). 
CAMPISANO (DO NOT DELETE) 11/15/2019  7:22 PM 
548 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:525 
collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without 
apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census 
or enumeration.”203  The Plaintiff States argued that the federal government 
had violated this Amendment by capping the SALT deduction.204  The 
complaint discussed the long history behind the passing of this Amendment 
and the fierce opposition it faced from states at the time of ratification.205  
Specifically, states at that time were wary of the Amendment because they 
feared the ability of the federal government to interfere with the states’ 
taxation of its citizens.206  The Plaintiff States argued that the legislative 
history in conjunction with the Plaintiff States’ reliance on the perpetuity of 
the SALT deduction in all former legislation caused the current limitation 
to run afoul of this Amendment.207 
The Defendants, on the other side, denied that the Sixteenth 
Amendment limits Congress’s authority to set taxes based merely on the 
history of its ratification and without any textual support.208  The Sixteenth 
Amendment makes no provision for the states, either explicit or implicit.209 
The Plaintiff States, in their reply to the Defendants’ motion to 
dismiss, did not focus as heavily on the Sixteenth Amendment argument 
and seemed to shift gears to argue “the States’ original and sovereign 
‘power of taxation,’ which predates the Founding . . . was incorporated into 
our constitutional structure.”210  The Plaintiff States then relied on the 
history of the SALT deduction and the continued allowance of a “near-
total” SALT deduction to argue that the departure from this past was 
telling.211  They argued if Congress actually had the power to extensively 
narrow SALT’s deductibility, it would have done so before now.212  The 
Defendants, however, pointed out that, throughout its history, the SALT 
deduction has been limited in one way or another.213 
The Defendants also underscored the fact that while there was push-
back against the ratification of the Amendment by the states, the SALT 
deduction was never even brought up.214  Overall, the Plaintiff States faced 
a major issue in the lack of protection the Sixteenth Amendment provides, 
 
 203  U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
 204  Complaint, supra note 179, at 49. 
 205  Complaint, supra note 179, at 42.  
 206  See id.  
 207  Complaint, supra note 179, at 41–42. 
 208  See Motion to Dismiss, supra note 181, at 21–20. 
 209  See Motion to Dismiss, supra note 181, at 20–26; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
 210  Opposition, supra note 112, at 17–18. 
 211  Id.  
 212  Opposition, supra note 112, at 15.   
 213  Reply, supra note 188, at 12.  See also supra Part III.   
 214  Motion to Dismiss, supra note 181. 
CAMPISANO (DO NOT DELETE) 11/15/2019  7:22 PM 
2019] COMMENT 549 
as even a broad reading could fail to implicate the states’ interest in 
maintaining a tax base with the ability to pay. 
It is important to note, aside from these arguments, that the Plaintiff 
States’ broad reading of the protections the Sixteenth Amendment provides 
goes against prior Supreme Court precedent that has stated “that the whole 
purpose of the Amendment was to relieve all income taxes when imposed 
from apportionment from a consideration of the source whence the income 
was derived.”215  Additionally, state tax courts have also found that states 
have a right to impose an income tax independent of the Sixteenth 
Amendment and that a state’s ability to impose a tax arises out of a 
sovereign right and not from the Sixteenth Amendment.216 
2. Tenth Amendment Argument 
The Tenth Amendment prohibits the federal government from 
invading the sovereign authority of the states and also requires the federal 
government to respect the equal sovereignty of the states.217  The Plaintiff 
States argued that the federal government had violated this Amendment 
through the SALT deduction cap.218  The heart of this contention was that, 
by eliminating the full deduction, the federal government was forcing 
certain states to choose between changing their tax policies or foregoing the 
benefits of the TCJA.219 
There are of course limits to the extent to which the federal 
government can impose its will on states via fiscal policies.  In Garcia v. 
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, the Court held that the check 
on the federal government should come from the political process.220  In 
essence, the state’s representation in the federal government should 
represent its interests in a manner that conforms with the Tenth 
Amendment.221  This, however, advances the Plaintiff States’ argument that 
they were denied a fair political process in this matter because of the 
rushed, highly partisan way in which the tax bill was passed.222 
Another factor here is the coercive nature of the federal government’s 
 
 215  Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 18 (1916).  It is notable that this case 
comes from early in the federal income taxes’ history and at that time it was thought of as 
merely a way around apportionment to the states.  This could suggest a history contrary to, 
and almost as deep rooted as, the one argued by the Plaintiff States. 
 216  Hanson v. Comm’r of Revenue, 2002 Minn. Tax LEXIS 23, at *6–7 (Minn. T.C. 
Oct. 15, 2002).   
 217  Motion to Dismiss, supra note 181, at 29–30. 
 218  Motion to Dismiss, supra note 181, at 29. 
 219  See Motion to Dismiss, supra note 181, at 10–12.  
 220  469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985). 
 221  See id.   
 222  Complaint, supra note 179, at 45. 
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enactment.  New York v. United States involved a state challenge against 
the sanctions and incentives provided by the federal government to 
encourage compliance with a federal regulatory program.223  The Court in 
that case pointed out that fiscal incentives by the federal government would 
be upheld, but they could not be coercive to the states.224  The major 
concern in that case was political accountability;225 when the federal 
government forces the states to give effect to federal legislative policy, the 
state governments have no autonomy but remain accountable to their 
constituents.226  The SALT deduction cap could be viewed, and has been 
expressed to be, an incentive to get certain states to change their fiscal 
policies.227  Thus, the SALT deduction cap goes to the heart of the 
accountability of the Tenth Amendment argument. 
The Defendants, on the other hand, relied on New York v. United 
States to support their argument that if a power is delegated to Congress, 
such as the taxing power, then the Tenth Amendment will disclaim the 
reservation of this power to the state.228  They argued that the SALT 
deduction cap is an exercise of that taxing power and “that is the end of the 
matter.”229 
The Defendants also argued that the SALT deduction cap is in no way 
impeding the states’ ability to continue taxing their citizenry, nor is it 
actually impairing their ability to spend how they wish.230  They relied on 
South Carolina v. Baker, in which the court upheld a tax-based incentive 
that was provided to states to alter their bond issuing practices.231  Thus, the 
Defendants similarly argued that the cap may be making state taxation 
more difficult.232  This is either because people may not want to continue to 
pay the taxes required to maintain the level of public service without 
receiving a deduction or if the states do cut the rates, they will not have the 
requisite funds.233  Despite this, the Defendants argued that the federal 
government is still leaving the states with a choice and are not exerting 
impermissible force because of this.234 
 
 223  505 U.S. 144, 152–54 (1992). 
 224  See id. at 176. 
 225  Id. at 168–69. 
 226  Id.   
 227  See Complaint, supra note 179, at 6. 
 228  Motion to Dismiss, supra note 182, at 13, 31. 
 229  Id.  
 230  Motion to Dismiss, supra note 182, at 14, 31. 
 231  Motion to Dismiss, supra note 182, at 32 (citing South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 
505, 513–15 (1988)). 
 232  Id. 
 233  Id. 
 234  See Motion to Dismiss, supra note 182, at 31.   
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In replying to the Defendant’s motion to dismiss, the Plaintiff States 
argued that the coercion used here is the same that was expressly 
disallowed in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 
where the court held that Congress cannot “put so much pressure on States 
as to effectively undermine their sovereignty.”235  That is what the Plaintiff 
States claimed was occurring.236  Additionally, the Plaintiff States pointed 
to comments made in the news and by lawmakers regarding the SALT 
cap.237  Many involved attacks on how the Plaintiff States’ governments are 
run and expressed a desire to challenge those states.238  The Defendants, 
however, in their reply, pointed to the fact that these comments do not 
affect the constitutionality of the provision, meaning it is constitutional 
regardless of the true intent behind them.239 
3. Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution Argument 
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution states that “[t]he Congress shall 
have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay 
the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the 
United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform 
throughout the United States . . . .”240  This concern did not come up 
explicitly in either of the parties’ arguments, perhaps because the federal 
income taxes at issue were, by their nature, not uniform throughout the 
states.  Despite that, it merits mention as it could play a more important 
role on appeal. 
4. District Court’s Resolution 
The district court interpreted all three of the above as one claim, 
resting on two separate arguments.241  The Plaintiff States’ first argument, 
in the court’s interpretation, was that any attempt to eliminate or 
substantially curtail the SALT deduction upsets the constitutional 
balance.242  While the court agreed with the Plaintiff States that the change 
to the SALT deduction was unprecedented and the court may properly 
consider historic understanding and practice in ruling on constitutionality, 
the court held that novelty is not fatal in this context, it merely informs the 
 
 235  Opposition, supra note 112, at 26 (quoting Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 
567 U.S. 519, 576–77 (2012)).   
 236  Id.   
 237  Id.  
 238  Opposition, supra note 112, at 29–30. 
 239  Reply, supra note 188, at 19.   
 240  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 241  New York v. Mnuchin, No. 18-CV-6427 (JPO), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168754, at 
*34–35 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2019).   
 242  Id. at *35. 
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courts understanding of structural limitations.243  Rather, the court found it 
must ask if the failure of the federal government to previously impose a 
condition comes from such a structural limitation.244  The court relied upon 
South Carolina v. Baker for the proposition that just because a certain tax 
had always been exempt from federal taxation does not mean the 
exemption is frozen, as long as there is no constitutional bar to it.245  The 
court further relied on Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Company.246 
and Lyeth v. Hoey247 to find that the federal government has plenary power 
of taxation and as the Plaintiff States did not point to any constitutional 
principal that would bar Congress in this instance, there was no 
constitutional bar to the SALT cap enactment.248  Therefore, the Plaintiff 
States claim failed in regard to this argument.249 
The Plaintiff States’ second argument, in the court’s interpretation, 
was that the cap was “an unlawful effort by Congress to wield its 
regulatory authority in a way that coerces specifically targeted states.”250  
The court, however, declined to look into the motives of Congress in 
enacting the cap as “an otherwise valid federal law does not offend the 
Constitution simply because it seeks to affect state policies.”251  Thus, the 
court looked to the effects of the cap, not the motive behind it.252  The court 
ultimately found that the harms here did not rise to the level of a 
constitutional violation because the consequences were not so harmful that 
the States had “no real option but to acquiesce.”253  Thus, the Plaintiff 
States’ claims survived attacks on the district court’s jurisdiction to hear 
their claim, but the claims ultimately failed on the merits. 
While there is some resolution of this matter now, there is the 
possibility of appeal.254  Thus, it is important to understand the limitations 
of the Plaintiff States’ case moving forward on appeal in order to 
understand the small likelihood the case has of advancing.  Further, even if 
the Plaintiff States do ultimately prevail, and the cap is repealed, there will 
still be a hole in the budget that the increased revenue the cap provided was 
 
 243  Id. at *35–37. 
 244  Id. at *38. 
 245  Id. at *40–41. 
 246  240 U.S. 1 (1916).  
 247  305 U.S. 188 (1938).  
 248  Mnuchin, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168754, at *38–39. 
 249  Id. at *43–44. 
 250  Id. at *35. 
 251  Id. at *45 (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)).  
 252  Id. at *49.   
 253  Id. at *50–53 (quoting Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 582 
(2012)).   
 254  See Stempel, supra note 182.   
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supposed to fill.  Therefore, some other method of reform would be 
necessary. 
VII. STATUTORY REFORM AS AN ALTERNATIVE 
It is clear, based on the impact the TCJA is likely to have, that the 
SALT provision, as it stands, cannot endure.255  It is also clear that the 
legislative actions by the states and municipalities have either failed or are 
unlikely to succeed in getting around the new SALT cap.256  Additionally, 
the judicial attempt by New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Maryland 
is not likely to succeed, as the case has been dismissed and faces some very 
serious issues on appeal.257  Yet, even if the Plaintiff States do succeed and 
the provision is repealed, it would perhaps be better to alter the statute 
instead of eliminating any kind of limitations on SALT, considering 
legislative intent and concerns over creating an even greater national 
deficit.258  Reports regarding the TCJA show that this cap, in addition to 
other tax law changes, will raise about $688 billion.259  The Joint 
Committee on Taxation expects federal expenditures260 for SALT 
deductions to decrease from $100.9 billion to $24.4 billion from fiscal year 
2017 to fiscal year 2020, making this a large revenue raiser in the TCJA.261  
Therefore, the best option available is to amend the SALT provision. 
The current law applies a blanket cap of $10,000 on taxpayers 
regardless of income.262  Instead of imposing a cap on deductions from 
income, which does not account for differences in income, the SALT 
provision should be amended so that the SALT deductions phase out based 
on the taxpayers AGI to a minimum $10,000 deduction.  AGI is the total 
income subject to tax, minus “above-the-line deductions,” which do not 
include itemized deductions.263  The use of AGI to determine the amount of 
 
 255  See supra Part IV.  
 256  See supra Part V.  
 257  See supra Part VI. 
 258  See supra Part III.  
 259  STAFF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 115TH CONG., ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE 
CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR H.R.1, THE “TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT” (Dec. 18, 2017),  
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=5053. 
 260  A tax expenditure is defined as “the deductions, credits, exclusions, exemptions, and 
other tax preferences that represent departures from a ‘normal’ tax code.”  William 
McBride, A Brief History of Tax Expenditures, TAX FOUND. (Aug. 22, 2013), 
https://files.taxfoundation.org/legacy/docs/ff391.pdf.  This idea was first introduced by 
Stanley Surrey, who noted that many tax preferences resemble spending.  Id.  
 261  STAFF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 115TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX 
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2017–2021, tbl. 1 (Comm. Print 2018). 
 262  26 U.S.C. § 164(b)(6)(B) (2018).  There is, however, a $5,000 limit if the taxpayer’s 
filing status is married, filing jointly.  Id.  
 263  JCT Overview, supra note 6, at 4. 
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deduction that can be taken is common to many phase-outs within the IRC 
and is utilized in other deductions.264  By having it phase out to a minimum 
of $10,000, however, it preserves the deduction to some extent even for 
those with a high AGI. 
Utilizing this method will redistribute some of the impact from 
geographical locations.  Just because the taxpayers are in a high-property-
tax state does not mean the SALT provision will necessarily impact them.  
Rather, it will only impact them if they have a corresponding higher level 
of income.  The counterargument to this is that the same states will still be 
impacted more harshly because income tends to be higher in these areas.  
While this is a valid concern, this method is still a better alternative 
because it honors the goal of a progressive income taxation: higher taxes 
for those with higher income. 
This plan would also better reflect certain limitations that were placed 
on the SALT deduction prior to the TCJA.  Before the reforms, high-
income and some upper-middle-income taxpayers were subject to the 
Alternative Minimum Tax (the “AMT”).265  The AMT limited the amount 
of the deductions taxpayers could take if they made over a certain income 
level to ensure that these taxpayers would not have an inordinately small 
tax bill.266  With the TCJA, the amount of income needed to run afoul of 
the AMT is much higher, meaning it impacts fewer taxpayers now.267  By 
implementing an AGI-based phase-out, high-income taxpayers that did not 
get the deduction before because of their income levels will likely not get it 
now, maintaining the status quo, and strictly middle-class taxpayers that 
likely should have gotten the deduction but were disallowed because of the 
formerly broad reach of the AMT will be able to take it, creating a more 
equitable tax system.268 
Overall, this is a better alternative than what is currently in place 
because it provides a workable compromise that will limit the impact on 
high-property tax states but also, to some extent, allow the government to 
recover some of the revenue lost in other tax cuts in the TCJA.  This 
alternative strikes a compromise between the high- and low-tax states in 
terms of where the tax burden falls, without a disproportionate burden on 
the middle-class taxpayers of high-tax states.  Thus, while the increase in 
the cap protects those that cannot pay, because there still is a cap, there will 
 
 264  See 26 U.S.C. § 221 (for phase out for student loan interest deduction); former 26 
U.S.C. § 68 (prior to the TCJA taxpayers faced a phase out of itemized deductions based on 
the AGI). 
 265  26 U.S.C. § 55.   
 266  Id.   
 267  Id. § 55(d)(4).   
 268  Scott Ahroni, Congress and the SALT Deduction, CPA J. (Jan. 2018), 
https://www.cpajournal.com/2018/01/22/congress-salt-deduction/.  
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be the decreased federal tax expenditure, which is necessary to support the 
other changes under the TCJA. 
In New York v. Mnuchin, both parties pointed out that there is another 
option that would mitigate the harm caused by the SALT deduction cap: 
namely, the states most affected could cut spending and subsequently cut 
taxes for their citizens.269  This could disincentivize migration caused by 
the SALT deduction cap and cure that specific revenue issue for high-tax 
states.270  Proponents of this also feel that by re-examining budgets, high-
tax states would still be able to provide “high-value service at minimum 
cost.”271 
While this option may be lucrative from a strictly fiscal standpoint, it 
completely disregards the spirit of federalism.  If the states were to cut 
spending, it would not be because of any sovereign choice of their own, but 
rather in spite of their own choices.272  The citizens of those states made the 
choice to live in the state and pay higher property and income taxes 
because they wanted the increased social services, such as better school 
systems.273  For example, high-tax states like New Jersey, Connecticut, and 
Maryland are among the top ten states with the best school systems.274  On 
the other hand, low-tax states dominate the lower spots on the ranking.275  
It would be wrong for the federal government to step in and force the hand 
of both the state governments and the citizens of those states.276 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, high-tax states cutting their 
budgets could have a large-scale impact on the national economy.277  This 
is because high-tax states generally receive a fraction of the state’s baseline 
contribution of federal taxes.278  On the other hand, many low-tax states 
receive a multiple of their contribution.279  For example, Mississippi and 
Louisiana rank first and second for percentage of federal aid that makes up 
 
 269  See supra Part VI.  See also Chris Edwards, Tax Reform and Interstate Migration, 
CATO INST. (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.cato.org/publications/tax-budget-bulletin/tax-
reform-interstate-migration. 
 270  Edwards, supra note 269.   
 271  Id.  
 272  Policy Basics: Where Do Our State Tax Dollars Go?, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y 
PRIORITIES (July 25, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/policy-
basics-where-do-our-state-tax-dollars-go. 
 273  See Renee Morad, States with the Best Public School Systems, FORBES (July 31, 
2018, 9:24 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/reneemorad/2018/07/31/states-with-the-best-
public-school-systems/#487eff213897. 
 274  Id.  
 275  See id.  
 276  See Gordon, supra note 46.   
 277  See generally Complaint, supra note 179. 
 278  Complaint, supra note 179, at 36.  
 279  Complaint, supra note 179, at 36–37. 
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state revenue respectively, and both are low-tax states.280  On the other 
hand, New Jersey and Connecticut rank forty-first and forty-second 
respectively281 and both are high-tax states.  By cutting taxes and spending, 
these high-tax states would be remitting less, having a big impact on low-
tax states.282  Further, the fact that these low-tax states would benefit from 
what amounts to a federal subsidy cuts against their prior opposition to the 
SALT deductions on the grounds that it was a federal subsidy to high-tax 
states.283 
Therefore, while there might be other alternatives to the issues caused 
by the SALT deduction cap, they are fraught with issues that the AGI 
phase-out is not.284  Namely, the AGI phase-out would not create a 
disparity in detriment among the states and would not force states to make 
difficult choices that undermine their sovereignty.285  It would also be less 
likely to have unforeseen consequences regarding the distribution of federal 
money among states, nor will it have a major impact on federal revenues.286 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The new SALT deduction cap has created a number of issues in its 
wake. It appears that the cap has great potential to impact many different 
constituencies and in unexpected ways.  Those most impacted are a number 
of high-tax states, as well as residents of those states and businesses located 
within those states.287  The potential harm that could be caused ranges from 
decreases in property values, to fewer social services provided in the high-
tax states.288  There is also the potential for less federal revenue overall if 
states cut back on their taxes.  Additionally, the IRS response to 
workarounds for this cap will potentially impact charitable funds 
nationwide.289  Considering the state of the situation, there needs to be 
some form of change to the SALT deduction cap. 
A number of high-tax states, starting with New York, have passed 
state legislation to circumvent the effects of the cap.290  While the payroll 
workaround will likely not be disallowed by IRS regulation, it is unlikely 
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employers will utilize this, making it an ineffective solution.291  States have 
also attempted to provide state and local tax credits for taxpayers’ 
payments to charitable contributions.292  This legislative mechanism, 
however, has already run afoul of the IRS, which will only allow charitable 
contribution deductions to the extent that no tax credit was received for 
it.293  This interpretation has also subsequently created numerous issues.  
Thus, this is also an ineffective solution. 
Finally, high-tax states New York, New Jersey, Maryland, and 
Connecticut have sought relief from the cap through the courts.294  They 
argue that the cap violates their legally protected rights under the Tenth 
Amendment, the Sixteenth Amendment, and Article 8 Section 1 of the 
Constitution.295  While they make some arguments for their case, their 
complaint has already been dismissed and their success on appeal is not 
likely.296  Further, looking at the consequences, their unlikely victory 
would mean the invalidation of this new limitation in the IRC.  Because the 
federal government makes up a large amount of the revenue lost due to 
other tax cuts in the TCJA through the SALT provision, this could have 
serious implications for the national deficit.297  If the states are not 
successful, however, all of the above unintended consequences of the new 
provision have a high likelihood of coming to pass. 
Therefore, the best possible option is legislative reform of the IRC and 
a phase-out of the SALT deduction based on AGI would best serve the 
goals sought to be accomplished through this reform.298  Because it would 
be based solely on income, this phase-out would avoid over-taxing lower- 
and middle-income taxpayers, one of the main pitfalls of the current, 
unworkable deduction cap.  Further, this reform would effectuate a 
compromise that is workable for both high- and low-tax states,299 meaning 
that, in the end, no state would be left with salt in its wounds. 
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